Across Europe, defence cooperation is deepening. The EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation programme, or PESCO, now supports a growing list of joint military projects. These range from shared cyber defence tools to next-generation surveillance platforms. But some Member States are beginning to ask a new question. Should police technologies be included, too? At first glance, the answer may seem straightforward. PESCO was established to enhance military capabilities, not to support law enforcement. But technology has changed the nature of that boundary. Many of the tools being developed under PESCO today have clear uses in both fields. Surveillance drones, secure mobile networks, threat detection software, and real-time location tracking are all examples of systems that could just as easily support border police or riot control as they could military operations abroad.
Supporters of the idea point to efficiency. Why build two versions of the same technology when one could be adapted to both roles? Why not let police forces benefit from innovations developed through PESCO funding, especially when the underlying needs are similar? There is also a strategic dimension. If the EU is serious about building technological sovereignty, it must ensure that both military and police forces have access to secure, home-grown tools. Relying on foreign platforms for critical policing infrastructure is a known vulnerability. PESCO, as a cooperative platform with shared R&D capacity, could help close that gap.
But there are serious risks in pursuing this path without caution. The most important is not technical or financial. It is institutional. Police forces are not military units. They are civilian services, governed by public law and accountable to local populations. This distinction is essential for democracy. It is not just a matter of function. It is a matter of authority.
Civilian policing relies on public consent. That consent is built through transparency, legal safeguards, and the perception that police act as part of society, not above it. The introduction of military-grade technologies into policing environments, especially when funded through military frameworks, can undermine that trust. It may create the impression that law enforcement is becoming militarised in both form and function, even if intentions are good. Public perception matters. A drone flying over a demonstration is not just a tool. It is a message. If that drone was funded under a defence programme and uses algorithms adapted from battlefield models, citizens may reasonably ask what assumptions are embedded in its behaviour. They may question whether its use is guided by principles of proportionality or by tactical efficiency. These are not cosmetic concerns. They strike at the heart of policing’s legitimacy.
There is also the issue of accountability. PESCO projects operate under a distinct governance model compared to civilian EU agencies. They are less transparent, less open to public review, and often shaped by defence priorities. If police agencies begin to adopt tools developed in that environment, they risk importing not just the technology, but also the culture and assumptions that come with it. To avoid this, a clear separation of mandates must be maintained. Shared development of core technologies may be acceptable, but the application, testing, and governance of those tools in a policing context must remain firmly under civilian control. National police forces should not become downstream users of military tools without public debate, legal review, and proper democratic oversight.
One possible solution is to allow limited overlap in infrastructure while keeping operational development separate. For example, PESCO might fund secure communications hardware or advanced sensor modules. But the systems used to deploy them, the rules of engagement, and the data governance frameworks should be designed under policing-specific programmes, with full respect for privacy and civil liberties.
The future of security in Europe is not about drawing harder lines between domains. It is about designing systems that are effective, trusted, and legitimate. That means recognising where technology can be shared, and where authority must remain distinct. PESCO can support Europe’s security architecture, but it cannot become a shortcut for equipping police forces with military tools. Civilian policing must remain visibly and structurally civilian. Its legitimacy depends on it.
Public safety is not only a matter of capability. It is also a matter of perception. If we want citizens to trust their police, we must ensure that police technologies are developed, funded, and governed in ways that reflect democratic values and civil priorities.
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